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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-2420
___________
JOHN HART,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; LOUIS GIORLA, Individually and in his
official capacity as Commissioner of the Philadelphia Prison System;
JOHN DELANEY, Individually and in his official capacity as Warden
of Curran-Fromhold Facility; MICHELE FARRELL, Individually and in
her official capacity as Warden of House of Corrections; WILLIAM LAWTON,
Individually and in his official capacity as Warden of Philadelphia Industrial
Correctional Center and House of Correction; CHRISTOPHER THOMAS,
Individually and in his official capacity as CMR Director; BRUCE HERDMAN,
Individually and in his official capacity as Chief of Medical Operations of the
Philadelphia Prison System; SHEILA BEDFORD, Individually and in her official
capacity as Bail Commissioner of the City of Philadelphia; CORIZON; ARAMARK
CORRECTIONAL SERVICE, INC.; LT. JOSEPH MURRAY, Individually and in his
official capacity as a Lieutenant for the Philadelphia Prison System; C.O. RONALD
EURE, Individually and in his official capacity as a Correctional Officer for the
Philadelphia Prison System; C.O. JOHN #1 DOE, Unknown Correctional Officer,
Individually and in his official capacity as a Hearing Examiner for the Philadelphia
Prison System; GERALD MAY, Individually and in his official capacity as a Major for
the Philadelphia Prison System; WARDEN KAREN BRYANT, Individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center; C.O. JOHN
#2 DOE, Unknown Correctional Officer, Individually and in his official capacity as a
Hearing Examiner for the Philadelphia Prison System; JAMES ARNONE, Individually
and in his official capacity as a Physician for the Philadelphia Prison System; C.O.
CHARLES HARMER; C.O. DEIDRA THORNTON; JHEOVANNIE WILLIAMS; C.O.
RAMEL YOUNG; SERGEANT SOHAIL AKHTAR; C.O. NATALIA BAPTISTE;
SERGEANT ANNCELESTE GANGEMI
____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-06661)
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 6, 2019
Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 20, 2019)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
John Hart appeals multiple orders from the District Court: two orders granting motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and an order granting a motion for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, we will affirm in part and vacate in part, and will
remand for further proceedings.
I.
In his second amended complaint, Hart brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
stemming from his four-year incarceration in the Philadelphia Prison System (“PPS”)—
specifically during his incarceration at the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility
(“CFCF”) and at the Philadelphia Industrial Correction Center (“PICC”). Hart named
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This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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dozens of defendants, including many associated with the City of Philadelphia,1 as well as
Doctor James Arnone (a physician involved with Hart’s medical care at CFCF), and Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”) (the health care provider of PPS).2
As to the City of Philadelphia defendants, Hart claimed, among other things, that:
prison personnel failed to respond to his grievances; he suffered retaliation, allegedly for
filing those grievances and for filing this lawsuit; his legal work was destroyed by prison
personnel; false charges of misconduct were filed against him, and he was transferred to
administrative or punitive segregation as a result of those misconduct charges; and the City
of Philadelphia allegedly instituted unconstitutional policies. With regard to Dr. Arnone
and Corizon, Hart alleged that he was denied medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
The District Court granted Dr. Arnone’s motion to dismiss on July 28, 2017. Dkt.
#84. On September 21, 2017, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the

1

These include Louis Giorla, the Commissioner of PPS, John Delaney, the Warden of
CFCF, Michele Farrell, the Warden of CFCF, William Lawton, the Warden of the PICC,
Karen Bryant, the Warden of PICC, Christopher Thomas, the Director of Records at
CFCF, Bruce Herdman, Chief of Medical Operations of PPS, Sergeants Annceleste Gangemi and Sohail Akhtar of CFCF, CFCF Correctional Officers Jheovannie Williams, Natalia Baptiste, Ronald Eure, Ramel Young, Deidra Thornton, PICC Director of Security,
Gerald May, PICC Correctional Officer Joseph Murray, Correctional Officer Charles
Harmer, a hearing examiner for PPS, Correctional Officer John Doe #1, a hearing examiner for PPS, Correctional Officer John Doe #2, a hearing examiner for PPS and Correctional Officer John Doe #3, a mail officer for PPS (collectively, the “City of Philadelphia
defendants”).

2

Hart also named Aramark Correctional Service, LLC (a food service provider for the
PPS). The District Court granted Aramark’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. Dkt. #87. Hart does not appeal this order.
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City of Philadelphia defendants. Dkt. #89. A few days later on September 29, 2017, before
discovery had taken place, Corizon filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #91. The
District Court granted that motion on March 2, 2018. Dkt. #98. Hart timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of the
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fleisher v.
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and
construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
Similarly, we review the District Court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment
de novo. Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422–23 (3d Cir. 2006).
“To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting under
color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.” Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 423. It is undisputed that the City of Philadelphia
defendants, Dr. Arnone, and Corizon are state actors for purposes of § 1983; thus our focus
is on whether Hart has adequately alleged a violation of his constitutional rights. We
4

address each party in turn.
A. City of Philadelphia defendants
Hart challenges the grant of the City of Philadelphia defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion on procedural and substantive grounds. First, he argues that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
was a serial motion barred by Rule 12(g)(2). Second, he argues that he set forth sufficient
facts to survive the motion to dismiss, and further argues that, even if he did not, he should
have been allowed to amend his complaint. We disagree.
Rule 12(g)(2) prohibits successive Rule 12(b)(6) motions raising “a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.” See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(g)(2). However, “[a] district court’s decision to consider a successive Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is usually harmless, even if it technically violates Rule
12(g)(2).” Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2015).
Relevant here, the City of Philadelphia defendants filed a motion pursuant to Rule
8(a)(2), asking the District Court to strike the second amended complaint because it was
unnecessarily long and cumbersome, and thus failed to satisfy Rule 8’s pleading standards.
Dkt. #56. The District Court denied this motion, and the City of Philadelphia defendants
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Because the basis for the
first motion was Rule 8—that the complaint did not comply with the applicable pleading
standards—we do not view Rule 12(g)(2)’s bar of successive Rule 12 motions as being
applicable.3
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In his reply brief, Hart argues that Rule 8(a)(2) does not provide any ground to “strike”
a pleading, and thus contends the motion was, in reality, a motion to strike pursuant to
5

Turning to Hart’s substantive challenges, he argues on appeal that he sufficiently
alleged facts to support his claims against the numerous City of Philadelphia defendants.
Much of his brief on appeal is dedicated to pointing to paragraphs in his second amended
complaint where he believes he set forth these necessary facts, which he contends the District Court overlooked or ignored. Additionally, he continuously argues that Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement, and maintains that, if what he provided was insufficient, he should have been allowed to amend his complaint for a third time.4
A complaint must do more than allege entitlement to relief; rather a complaint has
to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
211 (3d Cir. 2009). “As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, ‘[w]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id.

Rule 12(f). Appellant’s Reply Br. 3. Therefore, he argues, the subsequent Rule 12(b)(6)
motion should have been barred as successive under Rule 12(g)(2). Appellant’s Reply
Br. 3. Even if we accepted Hart’s contention that the City of Philadelphia defendants’
first motion was indeed a Rule 12(f) motion, we would not find reversible error, as any
error was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (when considering an appeal, we must give
judgment “without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties”); Leyse, 804 F.3d at 321–22 (“So long as the district court accepts all of the
allegations in the complaint as true, the result is the same as if the defendant had filed an
answer admitting these allegations and then filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the
pleadings, which Rule 12(h)(2)(B) expressly permits.”).
4

Hart does not challenge the District Court’s determination that he failed to allege a Monell claim as to the City of Philadelphia. See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d
1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting how a municipality may be held liable under § 1983).
Accordingly, we need not address that issue. See F.D.I.C. v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169
(3d Cir. 2000) (finding an issue not raised in opening brief on appeal was waived and
would not be addressed).
6

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)) (alterations in original).
Here, the District Court meticulously went through Hart’s voluminous second
amended complaint, pulled out all of the allegations aimed at the City of Philadelphia defendants, and ultimately determined that Hart failed to provide factual detail to support his
generic statements. For example, with respect to many of the City of Philadelphia defendants, the District Court determined that Hart failed to allege personal involvement with
sufficient particularity. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988)
(noting a defendant in a § 1983 action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs, and such personal involvement must be alleged with appropriate particularity); see
also Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting “a civil rights complaint
is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible”). With respect to the false misconduct charges that Hart alleges various City of Philadelphia defendants filed against him, the District Court determined Hart was given disciplinary hearings
to contest these allegedly false charges. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653–54
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting that “due process is satisfied where an inmate is afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend against the allegedly falsified evidence and groundless
misconduct reports”); see also Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The
prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly
accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”).
Upon our review of Hart’s second amended complaint, we agree that Hart has alleged, but has not shown, that he is entitled to relief. Much of the second amended complaint contains conclusory allegations that do not provide detail beyond averring that
7

“Defendant [X]” harmed Hart in some capacity, which is insufficient to state a claim.5 See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that, while the pleading standard of Rule 8 does not require
“‘detailed factual allegations,’” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and that a complaint is insufficient “if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557)). Furthermore, given the circumstances of this case, including the fact
that Hart was allowed to amend his complaint twice, the District Court did not err in declining to invite additional amendment of his complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Dr. James Arnone
Hart maintains that he adequately alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment in
his second amended complaint. Specifically, Hart claims that Dr. Arnone violated his constitutional right to adequate medical care because Dr. Arnone discontinued a prescription
for a lotion to treat a skin condition that was prescribed by another doctor. He also argues
that, if detail is lacking in his second amended complaint, he should be allowed to amend
his complaint again. We disagree.
In order to sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hart must “make
(1) a subjective showing that [Dr. Arnone was] deliberately indifferent to [his] medical
needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious.” Pearson v. Prison

5

For purposes of brevity, we need not go through every single instance of alleged misconduct for every single City of Philadelphia defendant, including, inter alia, Hart’s retaliation and access to the courts claims. The District Court has already addressed all of
Hart’s claims, and we agree with the determinations detailed in the memorandum order.
8

Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)). As to the subjective prong of the
Eighth Amendment test, mere errors in medical judgment or other negligent behaviors do
not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106–07; see also
White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Mere medical malpractice cannot
give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”)
Our review of the operative second amended complaint reveals that Hart has failed
to satisfy the Estelle standard. Specifically, Hart does not provide sufficient factual allegations to support the inference that Dr. Arnone had the requisite mental state for his actions to be considered deliberately indifferent to Hart’s medical needs. Cf. Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 237–38 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently connected his factual allegations to the alleged mental states of the treating physicians to state
an Eighth Amendment claim). Dr. Arnone’s decision to discontinue a lotion prescribed by
another doctor is not per se sufficient, and there are no facts alleged that support this action
was done maliciously. See White, 897 F.2d at 109–10 (noting that intentional interference
with prescribed treatment is one method of showing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but that no claim under the Eighth Amendment is stated “when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor” (emphasis in original)).
On appeal, Hart argues that he has established the deliberate indifference prong because he asserted Dr. Arnone’s decision was based on an alleged policy of Corizon which
9

encouraged its employees “to cut costs for medical services and medication in order to
increase [profits].” Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97–98. While we have found deliberate indifference in situations where “necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons,” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003), a complaint
must include more than labels and conclusions, formulaic recitations of the elements of the
cause of action, and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The paragraphs cited by Hart in the second amended complaint are such naked
assertions, and do not nudge his claims of deliberate indifference “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 680. In any event, as the District Court correctly determined, Hart also fails to state a claim because he has failed to allege facts that support the
conclusion that his skin condition6 is sufficiently serious for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.7 See Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1023 (noting a prisoner’s condition “must be such that a
failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or
death” (emphasis added)).8 For the reasons already noted above, the District Court did not

6

The operative second amended complaint does not specify what the skin condition is,
but the first amended complaint stated that the condition is Keratosis Pilaris, which was
described by Dr. Arnone as “a common skin condition that causes rough patches and
small, acne-like bumps usually on the arms, thighs, cheeks and buttocks.” Dkt. #84 at 2.
7

Indeed, the second amended complaint omits the name of the skin condition, omits any
description of the symptoms of the skin condition and how it affects Hart, and omits how
failure to treat the condition could lead to further injury or unnecessary suffering.
8

Hart appears to argue on appeal that because he was prescribed medicine for his skin
condition, he has satisfied the “serious medical need” prong of Estelle. We do not believe the one-time prescription of medication is a per se indication that a condition is “serious” for purposes of Estelle. See White, 897 F.2d at 110 (“There may, for example, be
several acceptable ways to treat an illness.”). Moreover, Hart has failed to allege that the
10

err in declining to invite additional amendment of the complaint. See Grayson, 293 F.3d
at 111.
C. Corizon
On appeal, Hart appears to argue that the District Court erred by prematurely granting summary judgment to Corizon before he had the chance to conduct discovery. We
agree, and will remand as to this issue.
“It is well established that a court is obliged to give a party opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery.” Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 565
(3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is necessary because, by its very
nature, the summary judgment process presupposes the existence of an adequate record.”
Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). Consequently, if the non-moving party believes that additional discovery is required, the proper
course is to file a discovery request pursuant to Rule 56(d).9 Id.; see also Shelton, 775 F.3d
at 567–68 (noting that a formal motion is not required to request discovery under Rule 56
and consequently “nothing precludes a party from requesting an opportunity for discovery
under Rule 56(d) by simply attaching an appropriate affidavit or declaration to that party’s
response to a motion for summary judgment”). An adequate discovery request pursuant to

prescription was even necessary or how the failure to treat the condition could lead to further substantial injury or unnecessary suffering.
9
“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the
motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery;
or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Rule 56(f) became Rule
56(d) after amendment in 2010. Shelton, 775 F.3d at 567.
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Rule 56(d) “specifies what particular information that is sought; how, if disclosed, it would
preclude summary judgment; and why it has not been previously obtained.” Shelton, 775
F.3d at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have made clear that, in all but the
most exceptional cases, failure to comply with Rule 56([d]) is fatal to a claim of insufficient
discovery on appeal.” Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, Corizon filed its motion for summary judgment a few days after the City of
Philadelphia defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion was granted. Corizon had previously filed
an answer to Hart’s second amended complaint, but, other than that filing, no other discovery had taken place. The District Court granted Corizon’s motion for summary judgment
because Hart failed to show the existence of facts that would establish a Monell claim
against Corizon. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583–84 (analyzing a § 1983 inadequate medical
care claim against a private corporation that provides medical care to prisoners under the
municipality liability of Monell). However, Hart argues on appeal—as he did in opposing
Corizon’s motion—that he cannot point to the evidence that the District Court found to be
lacking because he was not afforded discovery to find that evidence in the first place. Appellant’s Br. 19–20.
While Hart did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration, this is one of those
“exceptional circumstances” in which we may excuse Hart’s failure to comply with the
technical requirements of Rule 56(d). See Bradley, 299 F.3d at 207. In opposing summary
judgment, Hart specified the facts he wanted to explore through discovery and explained
why he otherwise lacked access to that information. See Shelton, 775 F.3d at 568. Because
no discovery took place before the District Court granted summary judgment, the District
12

Court abused its discretion in not heeding Hart’s request to allow him to conduct discovery
so that he could present evidence to properly oppose Corizon’s motion. See Radich v.
Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1393 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Whether a district court prematurely grants
summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Shelton, 775 F.3d at 568 (“If
discovery is incomplete, a district court is rarely justified in granting summary judgment[.]” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order on this
issue and remand for further proceedings.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders granting Dr.
Arnone’s and the City of Philadelphia’s motions to dismiss. However, we will vacate the
District Court’s order granting Corizon’s motion for summary judgment, and will remand
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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